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The limits of pretending
Phil Turner, Richard Hetherington,
Susan Turner and Maggie Kosek
School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier UniversityAQ2
¶
p.turner@napier.ac.uk
Abstract
We propose that pretending is a cognitive faculty which
enables us to create and immerse ourselves in possible
worlds. These worlds range from the veridical to the fan-
tastic and are frequently realised as stories varying from
the ﬁctional to the scientiﬁc. This same ability enables
us to become immersed and engaged in such stories
(which we may have created) too. Whether we are
shooting “aliens” or are engaged in a passionate
romance, these experiences are facilitated by our
ability to pretend. While it might seem that we can
imagine or make-believe anything, in practice there
are limits to what we can pretend. We draw upon both
theoretical perspectives and from the work practice of
animators. By identifying these limits, we are, of
course, also deﬁning the nature of pretending.
Keywords: pretending, animation, embodiment, sche-
mata
1. Introduction AQ3
¶Forbidden Planet (Wilcox 1956), one of the great-
est science ﬁction movies ever, is a direct inspi-
ration for this discussion. In particular, it was the
scene involving Lt. Ostrow who had just made a
cast of a “footprint” of an unknown creature
which had sabotaged the visitors’ starship. He
found himself confused by this plaster cast as its
make up violated “all known laws of adaptive
evolution” having the characteristics of both a
four-legged, ground-living animal and an arboreal
biped. And it was invisible.
We never see this creature, not just because it is
invisible (though there is an outline in a ﬂaring
force ﬁeld) but, it will be argued, because it is
unbelievable, in other words, we cannot believe
that it exists. And this is odd as we have little dif-
ﬁculty in believing a whole host of things which
are not the case such as interstellar travel and star-
ships manned by clean-cut Americans. We are
happy to believe that there are lost, “god-like”
civilisations, and that brilliant scientists have
beautiful daughters. Technological marvels such
as “ray guns”, “force ﬁelds”, and intelligent
robots present no difﬁculties but a creature
which is four-legged, tree-dwelling and invisible
is unbelievable. It is unbelievable because there
are limits on what we can pretend even in a
genre as forgiving as science ﬁction. Discussion
of the limits of this ability, our imagination and
what we can and cannot make-believe has
received some attention (e.g. Walton 1990;
Leslie 1987; Gendler 2008
AQ4
¶; Driver 2008 AQ5
¶
; and
Van Leeuwen 2011 among others) but such work
is very largely conﬁned within the high walls of
individual disciplines, and in the case of
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pretending, almost entirely limited to its develop-
ment in childhood. (Indeed, many researchers in
the ﬁelds of developmental psychology and edu-
cation continue to adopt Vygotsky’s (1990/1930;
1991/1931) position that pretending is superseded
by acts imagination in adults.)
We aim to build upon this body of existing
work from a structured, multi-disciplinary per-
spective. Our approach is twofold: ﬁrst, we adopt
a theoretical perspective which will bring together
threads of research from developmental psychol-
ogy, cognitive science and narratology. Second,
we complement this with insights from a particular
form of practice, namely animation. To restate this
as a research question, what are the limits of pre-
tending in adults, and thus of believability, and
as such how can this contribute to a new deﬁnition
of pretending.
1.1 Premises
So where to begin? Our ﬁrst obstacle is vocabulary
or more accurately, deﬁnitions. Pretending,
making-believe and imagining are intimately
related terms but their deﬁnitions vary very
widely both within and between disciplines and
there really is no consensus. Thus, even trying to
deﬁne our terms presents something of a concep-
tual mineﬁeld. So, in an attempt to clarify our pos-
ition, we would like to take a moment to make
explicit the premises which underpin our argu-
ment.
For the purposes of this paper we will treat
make-believe as the product of pretending,
which we deﬁne in turn as a mode of cognition
that allows us to think, act, emote as if or as
though something were the case. To pretend p is
to make-believe p. Unlike the treatment of pretend-
ing in psychology, which is largely conﬁned to its
developmental role in children, our discussion
concerns pretending in adults, and extends its
place from a behaviour which carries overtones
of deception to one which underpins speculative
and imaginative cognitive activity much more
generally. Our ability to pretend allows us to
both create and engage with stories of all kinds.
Stating that storytelling relies on pretending is
hardly contentious as authorities, including
Searle and Ryan among others, would readily
agree but we should also recognise that storytell-
ing extends beyond ﬁction to include such activi-
ties as the creation of scientiﬁc theories. Beyond
make-believe as the source of storytelling, our
engagement with stories also relies on pretence.
Having deﬁned pretending as a cognitive
faculty which is primarily concerned with creating
make-beliefs, pretending is at work when we
engage with virtual reality, or enjoy a movie at
our local IMAX or spend a couple of hours with
our games consoles “killing” aliens on a remote
planet. In each instance, the experience of being
present, engaged and active in these technologi-
cally mediated worlds relies on our ability to
pretend, and therefore, make-believe, that we are
(for a detailed discussion of this please see
Turner AQ6
¶
forthcoming1).
While it might seem that we can imagine, fan-
tasise or make-believe anything in practice there
are limits. When these limits are breached, what-
ever we are participating in becomes unbelievable.
Encountering unbelievability might be experi-
enced as a “plot hole” or similar breakdown in
the narrative, as an interruption to immersion or
a break in the sense of being present (e.g. Garau
et al. 2004). It might result in a computer game
becoming unplayable. It may result from an
unconvincing animation. Indeed, it may be
that unbelievability might be responsible for
many of the breakdowns in the experience of
digital media.
In discussing these limits we adopt a multi-dis-
ciplinary perspective bringing together develop-
mental psychology, cognitive science and
narratology. As a guiding framework we draw
very loosely on cognitive science and Marr’s
three levels of analysis (1982). These three levels
are the functional (what is pretence for), the algo-
rithmic (how is pretence expressed) and the phys-
ical (how is pretence instantiated).
To deﬁne the limits of pretending our major
focus is on the algorithmic, namely how is pre-
tence expressed while recognising the other
levels need to be addressed to provide the necess-
ary context. We begin with a discussion of the
function of pretending and then turn to how it
Turner et al.
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may be instantiated before turning our attention to
how it operates.
1.2 What is pretence for?
We identify two related purposes for pretending.
While this list is not exhaustive, it is reassuringly
broad. First, for children, pretending (as pretend
play) has an important role in “bootstrapping”
our social, affective and cognitive development.
Second, and more generally (children included),
pretending allows us to create stories by which
we explore and access the world. We now consider
these in turn.
1.2.1 Social and cognitive development
Pretending is important to the social and cognitive
development of children through its expression as
pretend play. Russ (2004), for example, has argued
that the development of a number of cognitive and
affective processes rely on such play, which
involves the exercise of alternating cycles of diver-
gent and convergent thinking, that is, the abilities
to generate a variety of different ideas, story
themes and so forth, and to weave them together.
Pretend play also facilitates the expression of
both positive and negative feelings, and the
ability to integrate emotion with cognition (e.g.
Seja and Russ 1999; Jent, Niec, and Baker
2011). Other researchers have highlighted the
importance of pretend play in acquiring the
ability to manage aggression and delay the need
for gratiﬁcation (Berk, Mann, and Ogan 2006;
Hirsh-Pasek et al. 2009). Early pretend play has
also been implicated in creativity in later life
(e.g. Russ 2004; Singer and Singer 2005). When
children take on different roles it allows them the
opportunity to acquire social skills such as com-
munication, problem-solving and empathy
(Hughes 1999). Garvey (1990) also tells us that
pretend play is the “voluntary transformation of
the here and now, the you and me, and the this
or that, along with any potential action that these
components of a situation might have”.
1.2.2 Storytelling: fact, ﬁction and make-believe
Pretending is also foundational to our ability to
engage with stories. Following the commentary
on Searle (1979) in Schaeffer (2013)AQ7
¶
, we adopt
Searle’s premise that ﬁctional narratives—
stories—ﬁrst comprise pretend speech acts in
which the author is pretending to assert that
events of the story took place. Second, for
Searle, stories are episodes of “intended playful
pretense” where the act of pretending is shared
between reader and author and narratives “pub-
licly function as props in a game of make-
believe”. Although the nature and operation of ﬁc-
tional logic is deeply contested in philosophy and
literary theory (and is beyond our scope here),
most accounts of the nature of ﬁction and “truth
in ﬁction” argue for the role of pretence and
make-believe (inter alia, Lewis 1983; Currie
1990; Byrne 1993; Goodman 2011; Gatzia and
Sotnak 2013). Byrne (1993), for instance, argues
that authors invite readers to “make believe that
certain propositions are true” following the case
made in Currie’s work, which asserts that
the author who produces a work of ﬁction is
engaged in a communicative act, an act that
involves having a certain kind of intention:
the intention that the audience shall make
believe the content of the story that is told.
(Currie 1990, 24)
Ryan (2008) applies such premises in her analysis
of interactive digital ﬁctional worlds, observing
that such media relies on an “act of make believe
whose prototype can be found in children’s role
playing games”, which may take the form of
ﬁrst-person embodiment or third-person obser-
vation. We also recognise that pretending as story-
telling offers a particular way to access the world,
for example, concerns were recently expressed
that very young children were re-enacting scenes
from the adult video game series Grand Theft
Auto, in effect that exposure to the game’s contin-
gent information opened doors to other worlds
(reported in the Daily Telegraph newspaper,
February 2014). More positively, make-believe
has a major role in design. Sophisticated 3D
models, for instance, allow architects, town plan-
ners and their clients to walk through, if not
other worlds, then possible cities and the buildings
therein. Interaction designers and potential users
make frequent use of scenarios that describe
The limits of pretending AQ1
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imaginary usage situations and personas who
animate them. It is commonplace for users to be
asked, in exactly these terms, to evaluate a design
by pretending to carry out tasks from a make-
believe scenario with a simple prototype which
they pretend is the ﬁnished version. Design ﬁc-
tions—descriptions of future technologies and the
possibilities they afford—support technology sta-
keholders and designers in more speculative
make-believe (Auger 2013AQ8
¶
among many others).
Finally, Toon (2010)AQ9
¶
has explicitly adopted
Walton’s make-believe theory of representation
in art to consider how models are used in scientiﬁc
reasoning. He argues that these models are props
in games of make-believe in a manner which “pre-
scribe speciﬁc imaginings” that is they afford and
constrain particular kinds of reasoning analogous
to the ways in which dolls and teddy bears pre-
scribe the pretend play of children. An example
of this is Einstein’s famous thought experiment
which involved him chasing a beam of light, an
act of make-believe which contributed to the
theory of special relativity.
We now consider how pretending is instan-
tiated as a mode of cognition.
1.3 Instantiation: embodied cognition
Consistent with current thinking in cognitive
science, we recognise that this cognition is not
conﬁned to the brain alone. Conventional treat-
ments of cognition have, in recent years, been
complemented by newer formulations which var-
iously describe it as “dynamic”, “external”,
“embodied” and/or “situated”. While space does
not permit anything like a thorough treatment of
these different accounts, cognition as an embodied
phenomenon does present itself as being particu-
larly relevant. Our reasons for this selection are
simple: pretend play in children, for example, is
joyously physical and active, or was until the
advent of tablet computers, while adult pretending,
ranging from acting to acting-out also implicates
the body. Recent neurological evidence further
suggests that the experiences of reading a novel
through to being immersed in virtual reality rely
on neural mirroring of the actual, embodied behav-
iour (e.g. Turner 2014AQ10
¶
).
1.3.1 Deﬁning embodiment
There is no one deﬁnition of embodiment, indeed as
Wilson (2002) has shown, there are many. It is,
however, generally agreed that the concept refers
to the way in which our understanding of, and be-
haviour within, the world is deﬁned and constrained
with respect to the form and capabilities of our
bodies. Merleau-Ponty’s argument that we access
the world only though our lived bodies, via the
“intentional arc”, remains foundational while
more recent authors extend or complement this
premise in a range of theoretical treatments (e.g.
Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962; Valera, Thomson, and
Rosch 1991 AQ11
¶
; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Gallagher
2006 AQ12
¶
; Clark 2008; Shapiro 2011). Borrowing
from Lakoff and Johnson (ibid AQ13
¶
, 17) we might
write, “that human reason is a form of animal
reason, a reason inextricably tied to our bodies
and the peculiarities of our brains” and “that our
bodies, brains, and interactions with our environ-
ment provide the mostly unconscious basis for
our everyday metaphysics, that is, our sense of
what is real”. As pretending is an expression of
this, our embodiment necessarily deﬁnes what can
be pretended. This is perhaps most easily witnessed
in our use of language and metaphor, that is, how
we talk about the world.
While these largely theoretical positions are
undoubtedly interesting, in recent years Haans
and IJsselsteijn (2012) have successfully integrated
Metzinger’s work (which we discuss immediately
below) with telepresence research concluding that
telepresence arises from the way we are embodied.
Inmuch the samemanner we argue that many of the
limits of pretending are again a consequence of the
way in which we are embodied.
1.3.2 Morphology, body schema and body image
Metzinger (2003a, 2003b, 2010) has proposed
three different forms or orders of embodiment
based on the morphology of the body, the body
schema and the body image, respectively. First,
since all human beings have a similar morphology
it is reasonable to assume that we all have, or are
capable of, very similar experiences, unless we
have a physical condition which limits our capa-
bilities. Our morphology thus affords a certain
Turner et al.
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range of experiences and denies us others—we are
normally bipedal and dexterous but we cannot ﬂy
without the aid of machines, nor can we see in the
ultraviolet. This ﬁrst order of embodiment is the
most basic.
Next, our body schema is involved in the regu-
lation of posture and movement and constrains the
possibilities for movement and action. This second
order of embodiment determines which of the
many ways we might actually do something (e.g.
drink from a cup or wield a light sabre) is instan-
tiated. Our body schema is also dynamic which
enables us to actively adjust to changing situ-
ations. Importantly for this discussion, it is at
this level of description that we ﬁnd external
tools acting as functional extensions to the body.
There is a corpus of empirical research which sub-
stantiates the claim that the body schema can be
extended to seamlessly incorporate tools and tech-
nological artefacts. As a result, the tool tempor-
arily becomes part of this tool-body functional
unit.
Finally, the body image comprises our percep-
tions of the body, which include the way we see
and experience our bodies, as well as any concep-
tual knowledge we have about them. From this
perspective, it has been suggested that the body
image can be thought of as intrinsic to conscious-
ness itself. Again, tools and other artefacts can
become part of this image but here the integration
operates at the level of the central nervous system
itself, that is, the tool effectively belongs within
rather than at the periphery of the body (cf. the
“rubber hand illusion”—Botvinick and Cohen
1998).
From this it is reasonable that we maintain an
understanding of the position, disposition of our
bodies and how tools are being used. This is
perhaps the weakest reading of embodiment: at
the other extreme, embodiment is a deﬁning
characteristic of our cognition. Between the two,
lies our ability to pretend.
1.3.3 Embodied language and storytelling
According to a variety of researchers, our use of
language readily reﬂects our embodiment. We
consider this from two perspectives. First, Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) tell us that “spatial-relations
are at the heart of our conceptual system” (30).
These relations are not directly observable but
form the basis of our ability to make sense of the
external world. They are based on bodily projec-
tions (or to phrase this differently, our sensorimo-
tor experiences) such as “in front of us”, “behind
us”, “above us” and “to our right”. These sensori-
motor experiences, they argue, subsequently
become conceptualised as metaphors. These
embodied metaphors in turn are aggregated to
form more complex metaphors. In essence,
Lakoff and Johnson argue that all our cognition
relies on rather simple bodily experience and
thus by this reading, so, too does pretending.
Embodiment is also fundamental to storytell-
ing. While there is considerable discussion in nar-
ratological theory of the body as a metaphor for
aspects of wider human and societal conditions,
our focus here concerns the qualities of the embo-
died form and the physical capabilities of narrators
or characters in themselves. Actors in a story may
be entirely homologous with their real-world
counterparts, or alternatively vary from the
normal in certain respects, or merge with other
types of being. What then limits or supports their
credibility in storyworlds? Punday (2003), while
observing that embodiment has received relatively
little attention from narratologists, offers a useful
discussion of how ﬁctional bodies inhabit ﬁctional
spaces, commenting that expectations about the
type of kinetic motion available to physical
bodies and the type of physical environments in
which (human) bodies can survive limit what ﬁc-
tional spaces are available and credible—just as
in episodes of pretending. Drawing on Scarry’s
discussion of the novels of Thomas Hardy
(Scarry 1983) Punday further observes that ﬁc-
tional bodies have access to several kinds of
space: those to which a character has ordinary
physical access, those to which they have percep-
tual access (hearing a conversation in a neighbour-
ing room, observing a scene through a window),
and spaces accessed only in the imagination or
in dreams, arguing that even the ﬁctional imagin-
ation remains constrained by real-world physical
experience. Even fantastical travel remains thus
The limits of pretending AQ1
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constrained: Punday cites the example of magical
movement in the Harry Potter series, where phys-
ical metaphors such as being sucked through
rushing water are employed, rather than descrip-
tions of forms of travel completely removed
from ordinary experience. Where such novel
bodily travel is presented to the reader—as in the
manifold forms of transportation found in
fantasy and science ﬁction—then it tends to be
instantaneous and completely disembodied.
2 How is pretence expressed?
We also propose that pretending is a form of think-
ing which is predominantly schematic in
expression. Schemata have been proposed as
both representations of knowledge and of action.
In the case of pretending, we argue that these sche-
mata are also embodied and reﬂect many of our
everyday behaviours.
Schemata hold representations of objects and
the relations among them, which can vary
between the simple to the complex, and the indi-
vidual to the social. Event schemata are more
usually treated as scripts (schemata for action),
proposed by Schank and Abelson (1977) as cogni-
tive structures that describe a sequence of events in
a given context and provide a readiness to respond
appropriately. A script comprises a set of “slots”
with rules as to what these can hold. This can be
most easily seen in Schank and Abelson’s most
famous example, the restaurant script. This script
describes how to behave in a variety of restaurants
by simply changing the contents of the “slots”
from, say, Chinese to Indian.
2.1 Mirroring the real world
Developmental psychologists have established
that what is pretended (i.e. the contents of a
pretend episode, and the behaviour of those pre-
tending) is governed by the same kinds of laws
and restriction that we encounter in the real
world. Reality may be suspended, but not
wholly. These rules, we argue, support believabil-
ity. The adherence to these laws and restrictions
has been described as “mirroring” and is derived
from real-world behaviour. (We note here that to
date, almost all empirical work on the operation
of pretending per se has been conducted with chil-
dren, and there is no extant account of adult pre-
tending.)
Possibly the most frequently cited example of
mirroring is Leslie’s description of a children’s
tea-party. He found that when he “tipped out”
and “spilled” the contents of one of the teacups,
the children regarded this cup to be “empty” and
continued to consider the non-tipped cups to be
“full”. So, while empty or spilled tea cups could
be reﬁlled with tea, “full” cups could not. From
quite a different perspective Kendall (1990) AQ14
¶echoes much of this when he observes that
games, cinema and a variety of other media are
governed by “principles of generation” which are
“reality-oriented”. This reality principle is, of
course, based on similarities to the real world.
He also proposes the mutual belief principle for
fantastic worlds, based on a tacit agreement
between the creator of these worlds and those
who experience them, and, we argue, echoing
the spoken and unspoken contracts among partici-
pants in pretend play.
Nichols and Stich (2005) AQ15
¶
tell us that pretending
begins with a premise which forms the basis for
subsequent inference and embellishment. The
premise may be bound or constrained by sche-
matic structures, writing: “clusters or packets of
representations whose contents constitute
‘scripts’ or paradigms detailing the way in which
certain situations typically unfold” (34). The role
of schemata or script-like structures also
features in philosophical treatments of story,
although they are not always acknowledged in
such terms.
Similarly, Walton’s pretence theory (1990)
refers to “background propositions” which are
imported by readers to extend the content provided
in the text and thus support pretence, while Currie
(1990) and Gatzia and Sotnak (2013), for instance,
discuss the role of “background assumptions”.
Such existing knowledge structures populate the
background of the ﬁctional world while make-
believe allows the reader to insert novel premises
into the text within the constraints of the ﬁctional
world.
Turner et al.
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Again, the narratologist Wolf (2014) elaborates
the “principle of access-facilitating, detailed
world-making”, whereby both real-world knowl-
edge and familiar albeit fantastic genres function
as schemata supporting the act of pretence which
constitutes the storyworld. Fantastic or unnatural
forms within ﬁctional texts take many forms
such as the storyworld’s topology, temporality,
physical laws and the capabilities of human,
animal or other animate bodies. Alber (2013)
further points out that for the active, sense-
making reader, story scripts and frames are fre-
quently blends of ﬁctional genres or aspects of
the real world. Other schematic ﬁctional devices
include the ascription of the unnatural to dreams,
fantasies or hallucinations, its employment as alle-
gory, satire or parody, or a role as part of a trans-
cendental world (heaven, hell, Scotland and so
forth), or as a basis for the construction of the
reader’s own tale, and ﬁnally a simple, serene
acceptance of the strange. Alber suggests that
such cognitive strategies in turn permit a fresh
view of the real world, thus adding to the list of
functions afforded by pretence.
2.2 Quarantining
Complementing mirroring is quarantining. Quar-
antining ensures that the events which occurred
within the pretended episode are taken to have
effects only within it. Continuing with the tea-
party example, the children do not expect that
“spilling” their “tea” will result in the table really
being wet. Behaviour and the consequences of
those behaviours are conﬁned (quarantined) to
the pretend episode. Perhaps the most interesting
aspect of quarantining is when it fails. The
failure to quarantine the attitudes, beliefs, events,
personae and behaviours of the pretend episode
is a source of childhood terrors, but in adult life
may be taken to be a mark of mental illness.
Popular familiarity with such failings is evident
in the all too frequent media reports of campus
gunmen which attribute their behaviour to
having played violent video games, although
meta-reviews suggest that reliable evidence of
cause-and-effect is much more sparse (e.g. Fergu-
son 2007; Barlett, Anderson, and Swing 2008),
and indeed Tavinor (2007) argues that many
researchers appear to be unaware of the mechan-
ism of quarantining.
2.3 The logic of events and of actions
Principles for ﬁctional illusion-making are pro-
posed by Wolf (2014) and Mieke Bal in her
now-classic introduction to the ﬁeld of narratol-
ogy. In short, most narrative texts rely on hom-
ology with the human “logic of events” whereby
the sequence of events is experienced as in accord-
ance with “some form” of the real world (Bal
1997). The phrase “some form” is important
here, since as many narratologists argue, as dis-
cussed above, while that form may be a familiar,
story genre it is not necessarily one that mirrors
the extant physical world, but may be unnatural.
Thus readers of fairy tales readily accept that
dragons exist, that animals talk and that heroes
in seven league boots cover just over 30 kilometres
in a single stride; in science ﬁction that the warp
drive performs a similar feat. This is congruent
with Wolf’s “principle of consistency”, whereby
ﬁctional works enhance the meaningfulness of
their storyworlds by rules either identical to
those apparently operating in real life, or by a “sec-
ondary kind of plausibility” acquired through links
to generic (schematic) conventions: cf. the earlier
discussion of scripts and schemata. Ryan (2008)
further notes that the digital world is also subject
to a set of “speciﬁc laws”.
3 Animation, embodiment and
pretending
At this point we shift from considerations that are
primarily based on theoretical treatments of pre-
tending to practice-based research. Animation
supports storytelling that would otherwise be
impossible: this section considers how animators
make things believable.
Animation calls on a variety of techniques
including hand drawings and painted cels; stop
motion, utilising a diverse range of physical
media (puppets, clay, human actors, paper and
cloth cut-outs); and computer-based 2D and 3D
methods. This is reﬂected in a similar diversity
The limits of pretending AQ1
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of outcomes. But irrespective of medium or tech-
nique, animators consider that for their work to
be successful it must be believable. As such, ani-
mation affords insights into the limits of pretence.
Wells (1998), for example, observes that it is the
tension between belief and disbelief which is
central suggesting that the act of viewing an ani-
mated movie is a dynamic process challenging
the viewer’s willingness to pretend. Believability
is not a prime concern for all animated movies
(cf. abstract animation), but there is a signiﬁcant
body of work where it is; and bearing this mind
a selection of examples and counter-examples
are presented to examine the constraints upon pre-
tending in the contexts of viewing or creating an
animated movie. The focus is predominantly
upon the embodied, animated character and uti-
lises examples ranging from the traditional to
state of the art animated computer-generated
imagery.
3.1 Embodiment in animation
We have already identiﬁed pretending as a form of
embodied cognition and there is complementary
evidence from the practice of animation. Students
studying animation are typically required to act out
actions—to act as though, while Disney himself
would frequently take stories and act them out in
meetings to show how he intended an animator
to create a character action. Marc Davis, one of
Disney’s core animators (referred to as “The
Nine Old Men”) regarded drawing as a form of
acting in which the limits of the individual body
are overcome and thus serving as a means of over-
coming the limits of pretending (Thomas and
Johnston 1981, 66). The consequences of this lib-
eration are visible in cartoons where characters can
readily reform their bodies back to normal after
various physical traumas or their limbs stretch
and articulate in strange ways (examples include,
Hanna Barbera’s Tom and Jerry and the Looney
Tunes short ﬁlms by Warner Brothers). Body mor-
phology and body schema derived from the real
world are redeﬁned, violated and exaggerated for
the purpose of entertainment without compromis-
ing believability.
Acting is more directly involved where rotos-
coping and motion/performance capture are
employed in the creation of an animated character.
Rotoscoping involves tracing over live-action
footage frame-by-frame thereby creating a distinct
form of animated movie. In terms of character, the
animator is presented with an actor’s performance
from the live-action footage and required to inter-
pret that along with the other elements of the
image to create the required aesthetic for the ani-
mated movie. The animator is thus working with
a secondary performance from their character,
entailing the risk that if motion is created for
motion’s sake and removed from the actor’s orig-
inal theatrical intention, the opportunity to create
the illusion of believable life is prejudiced.
Hooks observed that some of the live-action rotos-
coped for the Pocahontas character in the Disney
feature was inappropriate because the actress
involved—a dancer, walked like a dancer (toes
out, ball of the foot down ﬁrst) and not as the char-
acter should (Hooks 2003). In this situation, any
deviation from the established body schema was
considered undesirable.
In motion capture, an actor’s movements are
recorded by computer and applied to either a 2D,
or more usually, a 3D digital model, as discussed,
for example, in Chen, Shen, and Prior (2008). The
model can then perform the same actions as the
original actor. In addition to bodily movement
the increasing resolution of the technique now
makes it possible to capture more complex facial
movements and emotions—a technique referred
to as performance capture. Motion or performance
capture techniques are used to animate characters
in computer games and movies utilising 3D com-
puter-generated images. Perhaps the most
notable success in character creation has been
that of Gollum in the last two movies of The
Lord of the Rings trilogy. The ﬁnal performance
of Gollum was typically a blending of 3D charac-
ter design, acting, motion capture and animation.
While in some cases motion capture data enabled
a realism of movement considered impossible
with animation, animation was also essential, as
the non-human Gollum needed to move in ways
an actor could not. So the performance should be
Turner et al.
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regarded as extended and distributed across a
number of people involved in the ﬁlm’s production
including: the actor, concept artists, 3D artists and
animators, modellers and the motion capture crew.
However, when similar techniques have been
applied in the creation of hyper-realistic human
characters the results are often less than convin-
cing to the extent that the character can elicit
strong negative emotions and is said to have
fallen into an “uncanny valley” (e.g. Mori 1970AQ16
¶
;
Sobchack 2006; Plantec 2007; Aldred 2011). Con-
sequently, the limits of pretending may be more
limited in familiar situations.
3.2 Embodiment in cartoon animation
As we discuss below, conveying character is
crucial to successful animation, and a signiﬁcant
part of character creation relies on embodied
motion. An analysis of the work of the Disney
studios (Thomas and Johnston 1981) reveals that
considerable efforts were made to convey believ-
ability in animated cartoons through appropriate
visual and motion design which conveyed verisi-
militude yet was still entertaining. During the
1920s and 1930s the Disney house style evolved
from one familiar in newspaper cartoons with
characters created from basic shapes and having
simple actions, to more sophisticated characters
with realistic movement. The greater complexity
of these evolved characters opened up the narra-
tive potential of their stories allowing Disney
Studios to create a number of successful feature-
length movies. In such a situation an animator
would be challenged to apply caricature and exag-
geration to their character: action had to be reﬁned
to the simplest visual statement while retaining
personality through movement to create a convin-
cing and entertaining performance—something a
good actor or mime artist would do. The animation
techniques used were collated, reﬁned and docu-
mented into a set of 12 fundamental animation
principles—effectively the rules of the trade. In
essence, the principles were an encapsulation of
careful observations of movement and behaviour
in the real world (e.g. squash and stretch, antici-
pation and so forth) together with techniques
created in studio to bring out a character’s person-
ality and acting (staging). These principles have
proved to be robust and are applicable to other
forms of animation, including 3D computer ani-
mation (Lasseter 1987 AQ17
¶
).
Disney had a clear notion that what the studio
was producing had to communicate effectively to
an audience through what was termed “audience
involvement” (Thomas and Johnston 1981).
Achieving audience involvement could be
equated to successfully establishing an entertain-
ment environment that would enable pretence to
support almost anything in terms of narrative. It
can be seen that familiarity is a signiﬁcant
element in shared pretence. Disney said that
there must be an entry point through which audi-
ences can identify the situation of the story, and
the best way is through a character or settings
that resembles someone or something they have
known. The situation should be schematic,
afford a shared emotional reaction or an easily
recognisable aspect of someone’s personality
(Thomas and Johnston 1981). What is recognisa-
ble and credible is to a large extent ﬂuid and cultu-
rally determined, and indeed instances of
responses to changing societal norms can be
found in Disney’s increasingly active personiﬁca-
tion of female characters from SnowWhite and the
Seven Dwarves in the 1930s toMulan in the 1990s
(Shen 2007).
4 Discussion
So, to return to the research questions posed at the
start of this paper: What are the limits of pretend-
ing (and believability) and how do these help us to
deﬁne what is involved when we pretend? Having
reviewed and synthesised evidence from cognitive
science, developmental psychology and narratol-
ogy we proposed that pretending is deﬁned and
constrained by the fact of our embodiment and
expressed schematically.
4.1 Embodied pretending in theory
We introduced embodiment to the discussion of
pretending by way of pretend play, in suggesting
that it was readily recognised in the natural exuber-
ance of children. Pretending in children is often
The limits of pretending AQ1
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very physical and so, embodiment ought to be a
factor. Beyond that, the arguments from philos-
ophy and cognitive science are also persuasive.
Obviously, the fact of our embodiment must con-
strain the range and type of pretending. Similarly
our cognition must reﬂect the experiences we have
(which are generally mediated by our bodies).
Despite this we have yet to say very much about
actual “tangible” consequences of these con-
straints beyond making quite slight observations.
However, if we consider the comprehension of
pretending rather than its production or
expression, this changes. Understanding pretence
in another (or expressed on screen as an anima-
tion) is primarily a social process (or set of pro-
cesses) and social cognition itself relies on our
ability to “read minds”, that is, understand what
the pretender (or animated character) is doing,
thinking, feeling and intending. Gallese and Sini-
gaglia (2011) have written convincingly about
how we do this from both embodied and neuro-
logical perspectives. In essence, they bring
together two ideas: ﬁrst, that we simulate the
mental states of the other agent we are trying to
understand and that this simulation is embodied
(with all that implies). This embodiment is instan-
tiated by way of a “mirror mechanism”. This
mechanism is described as the mapping of the
sensory, motor and affective state of another onto
the corresponding systems of the perceiver.
Together this results in an embodied simulation
(ES) which enables us to read the minds of other
people. Gallese and Sinigaglia write:
A core claim of ES theory is that similar con-
straints apply both to those representations of
one’s own actions, emotions and sensations
involved in actually acting an experiencing
and also to the corresponding representations
involved in observing someone else perform-
ing a given action or experiencing a given
emotion or sensation; and the constraints are
similar because the representations have a
common (bodily) format. (2011, 515)
If we were to add “pretending” to the list of
actions, emotions and sensation then we can see
a kind of mirroring operating between pretender
and observer or between animation and audience.
Embodiment is essential to how we understand
pretending.
4.2 Schematic pretending
Schematic pretending, we have suggested, is evi-
denced in its expression. We can see it in pretend
play when it is described as “mirroring” (which
is used in a different sense to the section immedi-
ately above—see Section 2.1); we have seen it
various forms of make-believe where it is called
the “reality principle” (Kendall 1990); it appears
in narrative where it is recognised variously as
“genres”, “scripts”, “background assumptions”
or “background propositions”. It has also been
suggested that our memories are organised in
this form to aid with retrieval (or re-creation).
We now extend this to suggest that it is also an
aspect of anthropomorphism.
Just as the portrayal and engendering of affect
is an essential part of acting and crucial in the
establishment of an empathic relationship with
the audience, the animator needs to create an
empathetic response for their character (Hooks
2003, 2011). We suggest that it is one of the
means by which the audience can empathise
with a character, they identify with, and share the
feelings of, that character, projecting themselves
into what they observe. Indeed Disney asserted
that cartoon characters in the studio’s classic ani-
mations needed to be human enough for the audi-
ence to understand them and identify with their
situation and in order to achieve audience involve-
ment, the goal of the animator was to make the
audience feel the emotions of the characters
rather than appreciate them intellectually
(Thomas and Johnston 1981, 22). Or, put in
another way, the successful animator uses anthro-
pomorphism to support empathy with the make-
believe character by the familiar schemata of
human behaviour.
Shared affect also plays a role in anthropo-
morphism, one of the deﬁning characteristics of
much animation, and most signiﬁcantly in the
work produced by Walt Disney Animation
Studios (Artz 2002). Anthropomorphism that is,
Turner et al.
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seeing the human in non-human, is all but ubiqui-
tous human judgement (Guthrie 1993). People
commonly attribute human goals, beliefs and
emotions to animals, vacuum cleaners, coffee
makers and websites (e.g. Govers, Hekkert, and
Schoormans 2004; Turner, Wilson, and Turner
2009). In essence, anthropomorphism involves
attributing human-like characteristics and mental
states to non-human agents and objects (Gray,
Gray, and Wegner 2007).
Animals are often the leading characters in
Disney movies, and it is possible to identify two
distinct types: the animal as an animal, where the
animal would behave much like its equivalent in
nature. Examples can be found in backgrounds
of pastoral or woodland scenes. Then there is the
animal created as character such as Mickey
Mouse, Goofy and Donald Duck where anthropo-
morphism has been utilised. Techniques used to
anthropomorphise are diverse; but when coupled
with appropriate motion and sound design are
able to convey sufﬁcient familiarity to enable an
animated character to successfully act out a narra-
tive of feature ﬁlm length, and instigate and main-
tain audience engagement. Signiﬁers for such
characters include clothing or associations with
certain props. Embodiment again plays an impor-
tant role in the alterations to bodies and facial fea-
tures enable animated characters to communicate
through human-like gestures and facial
expressions: enlarging the eyes or adding the
whites of eyes could enhance expressiveness;
mouths were designed to be expressive and
enable dialogue to be spoken convincingly. Paws
became gloved hands to facilitate gestures; and
human-like qualities were enhanced when
animals that were naturally quadrupeds started
walking on two legs. Consequently, anthropo-
morphism became a convention animators used
to develop and communicate an animated charac-
ter to an audience and has been successfully
applied to animals, abstract forms and inanimate
objects frequently seen in advertising. Examples
of character concepts which exhibit anthropo-
morphism are shown in Figure 1.
Finally, even when animation breaks the
boundaries of strict naturalism, they continue to
follow familiar schemata which themselves are
remain predicated on everyday, recognisable
realism.
4.3 Further work
After this primarily theoretical discussion, we
identify three areas of further work.
First, this discussion has primarily focused on
pretending as a cognitive faculty but in practice
pretenders employ a whole host of external arte-
facts and representations—not least of which are
animated cartoon strips. Indeed the original
meaning of pretender is someone who “reaches
out for something”. So, with respect to further
work, we need to develop this account of pretend-
ing to include the external. We recognise that
Figure 1. Applying the human (schematic) body image to (a) a
pencil eraser and (b) a carp.
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Walton has already done this but from quite a
different perspective and one which does not
include embodiment.
Second, Cosmides and Tooby (2000)AQ18
¶
tell us
that our ability to pretend is the result of cognitive
de-coupling, that is, our ability to make use of con-
tingent information, that is, pertaining to that
which is close at hand. They write, “arguably,
one central and distinguishing innovation in
human evolution has been the dramatic increase
in the use of contingent information for the regu-
lation of improvised behaviour” (53). From this
reading, pretending is revealed as an improvised
behaviour and one which is readily susceptible
to empirical study.
Finally, while this paper has paid some atten-
tion to the role of anthropomorphism in pretence
and its relationship to believability, this again
merits empirical work.
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Note
1 Imagination has proved to remarkably difﬁcult to
deﬁne. Walton (1990, 19), for example, writes,
“What is it to imagine? We have examined a
number of dimensions along which imaginings can
vary; shouldn’t we now spell out what they have in
common?—Yes, if we can. But I can’t”. Similarly
Strawson (1970) writes,
The uses, and applications, of the terms
‘image’, ‘imagine’, ‘imagination’, and so
forth make up a very diverse and scattered
family. Even this image of a family seems too
deﬁnite. It would be a matter of more than dif-
ﬁculty to identify and list the family’s members,
let alone their relations of parenthood and
cousinhood.
Given these difﬁculties we will conﬁne our discus-
sion to pretence.
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